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Do fundamental rights obligate not only States, but also private transnational actors? Since violations of fundamental rights stem from the totalising tendencies of partial rationalities, there is no longer any point in seeing the horizontal effect as if rights of private actors have to be weighed up against each other. On one side of the human rights relation is no longer a private actor as the fundamental-rights violator, but the anonymous matrix of an autonomised communicative medium. On the other side, the fundamental rights are divided into three dimensions: firstly institutional rights protecting the autonomy of social discourses – art, science, religion – against their subjugation by the totalising tendencies of the communicative matrix; secondly personal rights protecting the autonomy of communication, attributed not to institutions, but to the social artefacts called ‘persons’; and thirdly human rights as negative bounds on societal communication, where the integrity of individuals’ body and mind is endangered.

HIV/AIDS VERSUS TNC

The disastrous AIDS epidemic, the numbers killed by which worldwide have overtaken those of the dead in all civil wars of the 1990s,1 took a special turn in South Africa with the legal case Hazel Tau v Glaxo and Boehringer.2 The case translates the multidimensional social issues into the narrower quaestiones juris: has the pricing policy of transnational pharmaceutical enterprises violated fundamental human rights? Can AIDS patients assert their right to life directly against transnational corporations (TNC)? Does ‘Access to Medication as a Human Right’ exist in the private sector?3 More generally, do fundamental rights obligate not only States, but also private transnational actors directly?

Thirty-nine pharmaceutical firms, represented by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa (PMASA), invoked South Africa’s national courts.4 In October 2003 the national Competition Commission had to decide whether the complainants had an actionable right to access to HIV medications

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against the firms GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim. From a technical legal viewpoint, the claimants based their legal position on the issue that the firms had breached Art 8(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 by charging excessive prices for antiretrovirals (ARV), to the detriment of consumers. They accused private collective actors of violating human rights: ‘The excessive pricing of ARVs is directly responsible for premature, predictable and avoidable deaths of people living with HIV/AIDS, including both children and adults.’ The surprising outcome was that the South African Competition Commission basically found for the complainants, even though it did allow the firms to amortise development costs.

The ‘horizontal’ effect of fundamental rights, ie the question whether they impose obligations not only on governmental bodies but also directly on private actors, is taking on much more dramatic dimensions in the transnational sphere than it ever had nationally. The issue arises not only for infringements of human rights by pharmaceutical enterprises in the worldwide AIDS epidemic, but it has already raised a stir in several scandals in which transnational corporations were involved. I shall single out a few glaring cases: environmental pollution and inhuman treatment of local population groups, eg by Shell in Nigeria; the chemical accident in Bhopal; disgraceful working conditions in 'sweatshops' in Asia and Latin America; child labour connected with IKEA and NIKE; the suspicions levied against sports goods manufacturer Adidas of having footballs produced in China by forced labour; the use of highly poisonous pesticides in banana plantations; disappearances of unionised work-

environmental damage arising from big construction projects. The list could easily be extended. The scandalous events fill volumes. At the core is the accusation that transnational corporations do lasting, irrecoverable damage to the environment and to people.

In the transnational sphere it is extremely hard to fall back on familiar patterns of solutions drawn from national constitutional law. While these solutions have dealt with the horizontal effect of fundamental rights, they usually dodge the tricky point of whether private actors are subject to direct obligations to respect fundamental rights by developing a host of doctrines whereby fundamental rights have only ‘indirect’ effects in the private sector. Simplifying grossly, there are two constructions to be found, though in numerous variants. Under the State action doctrine, private actors are in principle excluded from the binding effect of fundamental rights, unless some element of State action can be identified in their actions, which may be discovered either because State bodies are somehow involved or because the private actors perform some public functions. Alternatively, under the doctrine of the structural effect of fundamental rights, those rights impact on the whole legal system including private law enacted by the State, so that fundamental rights must be observed in the private sector, though the restriction of obligations to the legal system simultaneously implies that the private actors themselves are not subject to any obligation arising from fundamental rights.

In the transnational private sector, the question whether collective actors are themselves bound by fundamental rights arises much more acutely than in the law of the nation states. Here the otherwise omnipresent State and national law are almost absent so that the State action doctrine and the alternative structural legal effect of fundamental rights apply in only a few situations. In the global context, the State influence on private actors is more indirect, more distant, so that the doctrine of State action has only a limited scope of application. Furthermore, the

19 See the comparative analysis of Anderson, n 18 above, 31.
centre of gravity of fundamental rights lies still in the national constitutions, which means that their structural effect on the whole legal order is likewise limited to the nation states with few spill-over effects on transnational relations. Finally, transnational private actors, especially transnational corporations, regulate whole areas of life through private governance regimes of their own to a higher degree than their national counterparts do. Thus, the question whether they themselves are bound by fundamental rights can no longer be evaded.

This situation confronts legal policy and constitutional theory with enormous problems. Yet it would be simplistic to politicise the question directly, to reduce it to the political bifurcation between neo-liberal and social-democratic conceptions of fundamental rights, hegemonic or anti-hegemonic strategies, or Empire versus Multitude. 21 That would be tantamount to a political decision between either exclusively State-oriented validity of fundamental rights, or else their enforcement throughout society. 22 I suggest instead leaving the well beaten tracks of these debates and going a roundabout route through somewhat obscure territories of legal and social theory. The detour commences with what I call divisional concepts of fundamental rights and ends with ecological ones. This journey will open up a different view on fundamental rights in the transnational private sector. This view may be presented by considering the following question: Can the horizontal effect of fundamental rights be rethought, away from the perspective of interpersonal conflicts between individual bearers of fundamental rights, to a view of conflicts between anonymous matrices of communication, on the one hand, and concrete individuals, on the other? Can we understand human rights in the private sector in such a way that individuals may assert their rights against the structural violence of impersonal communicative processes?

DIVISIONAL CONCEPTS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

What does one gain and what does one lose by taking this detour? What happens if we no longer see questions about fundamental rights as a problem of balancing among rights of concrete actors, but rather as an ‘ ecological’ problem: as an injury that an expansive social system does to its social, human, and natural ecologies? Considering our general question, what do we gain from this perspective for understanding and analysing the horizontal effect of human rights in globalised sectors of society, outside of institutionalised politics?

In its search for just institutions, the European tradition has always aspired to construct an ‘ appropriate’ balance between society as a whole and its parts. It has oscillated between experiences of a divided society and abstract conceptions of the appropriateness of its internal balance. Justice to people by the institutions was the heuristic formula by which legal semantics reacted to changes in the social struc-


22 This suggestion is from Anderson, n 18 above, 31, 33.
The concept responded anew in each case to the painful experience of society’s internal divisions. Can a fair balance among individuals and between them and society be found in spite of these divisions? Or in non-individualist versions, can there be a fair balance among parts of society — estates, classes, strata, interest groups, ethnic and cultural identities, social spheres, sub-rationalities — and between the parts and society as a whole? Or can institutional justice only be achieved once society’s divisions have been overcome and a new unity of society brought about?

Justice to people by the institutions was seen on this view, which I shall call divisional, as a problem of society’s internal division into unequal parts — or more dramatically, of its destructive cleavages, its power and distribution struggles, and its antagonistic conflicts. How is an equitable unity of society to be guaranteed despite its self-destructive fragmentation? The classical answer was: Do not eliminate the divisions, but equilibrate them through *sum cuique!* Neutralise the dangerous divisive tendencies by assigning to the parts their due place in the overall order! Actual human beings were regarded as components of society; and justice was done to them, through the familiar formulas of *justitia distributiva* — the whole allotting to the parts (individuals, groups, sectors) their due share — and *justitia commutativa* — the equitable relation of the parts (individuals, groups, sectors) to each other.

Though the divisional view always predominated, the relation of the whole to its parts and the fair balance between them was perceived differently in the course of history. Feudal society primarily regulated the relations of the estates with each other. It guaranteed justice as the natural hierarchy between the *partes majores*, which at the same time represented the whole of society, understood as *corpus*, and the *partes minores*. Human individuals were always transcended in the estate or in the corporation. Subjective rights were not thinkable, still less fundamental rights, as strictly unilateral entitlements in the modern sense. Instead, the prevailing conception was that of *jus*, as a complex relation of divisional balance, fair in itself, between parts of different kinds, such as between feudal lords and vassals, as relations of loyalty and care in hierarchical reciprocity.

The bourgeois revolution rebelled against the injustice of distributive relationships between the estates. It responded to the divisional injustice by calling for the equality of all parts of society. In particular, fundamental rights followed a new logic, which, however, remained divisional: freedom of the parts in relation to the whole of society, equality among them, and solidarity as mutual support. Liberal theories thought through the new divisionalism consistently to its logical conclusion. Society consists no longer of intermediary bodies but only of individuals. Fairness would be guaranteed by self-regulating invisible hands that, underpinned by fundamental rights, coordinate the autonomous spheres of individuals: economic markets, political elections, competition of opinions, and free play of

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scientific knowledge. Interventions of compensatory justice would be admissible
only for rectifying the self-regulation among the parts.

The proletarian revolution’s theory of society again takes a divisional approach. The
totality of society consists of the social classes that spring from economic
structural contradictions. Justice will only become possible once the classless
society is born out of their antagonistic conflicts. In social-democratic Welfare
State conceptions, the parts of society, the classes, are transformed into socio-economic strata. Here again there is a divisional view, especially of the second-generation
fundamental rights. Social and participatory rights are aimed at
harmonising the living conditions of different strata as political, State-guaranteed
justice. 26

Ultimately, the great social theories also follow divisional patterns. This is clearest in concepts of a social division of labour that discover a fair balance in organic rather than mechanical solidarity. 27 In classical functionalism, the divisional element is to be found in the fact that a balance comes about through exchange relations among different functional spheres, and ultrastability is achieved by compensatory mechanisms when there are occasional disruptions, if necessary through State compensation out of the proceeds of growth. 28 And in conflict theories, insoluble permanent conflicts replace the just balance among the parts. In the polytheism of modernity among differing spheres of rationality, the hope for a lasting fair balance has given way to a resigned acquiescence in a chain of tragic decisions. 29

Specifically for human rights, these divisional theories of society have the con-sequence that they are conceived of as rights of the parts against the State, which represents the whole of society. Doctrines on the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the private sector follow this divisional approach. 30 What is involved is the distribution of the unevenly divided resources — power, wealth, knowledge — according to the pattern of justitia distributiva or commutativa. This program requires an extension of the State-citizen distributive pattern into society, or else resource allocation on the commutative pattern: fundamental rights as rights of the parts of society against each other. When political human rights are applied directly to citizen-citizen relations, a balance of the individual fundamental-rights positions of private actors against each other is drawn. 31 In the final analysis, however, it remains unclear how far and on what terms fundamental rights can claim validity in non-political sectors.

31 Representative the German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 89, 214; see also Alexy, n 30 above, ch 10; Brüggemeier, n 20 above, 17. Critical towards the subjective rights view, K.-H. Ladeur, Kritik der Abwägung in der Grundrechtsdogmatik (Tübingen: Mohr & Siebeck, 2004) 58–80.
ECOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

There is a deeper question, though: Is it at all appropriate to see the justice of institutions as divisional (distributive) justice between the whole and the parts (or, among the parts), and to regard human rights as guarantees — formal, material or procedural — to individuals against the society as a whole, with the State as its organisational embodiment (or, reciprocal guarantees by and to each of the parts)?

Systems theory here poses a different question: Is the internal division of society that creates injustice as inequality among people not just a secondary phenomenon? Society’s internal divisions should be understood otherwise, namely as resulting from the interrelations of communicative networks with their environment. Actual people are not at the centre of these networks, nor can they get back inside them. People are the environment for the communicative networks, to whose operations they are exposed without being able to control them. Systems theory argues that the autonomy of communicative networks excludes people radically from society. Systems theory is here coming close to theorems of social alienation from the tradition of social theory. At this point there are secret contacts with officially hostile theories: with Foucault’s analyses of disciplinary power, Agamben’s critique of political exclusion, Lyotard’s theory of closed discourses, and Derrida’s deconstruction of justice, even if these contacts are officially denied on all sides. This proximity can only be indicated here, not enlarged on.

The legal follow-up question is: If people are not parts of society, but forever banished from it, how are human rights to be reformulated? Whereas the European political tradition perceived the question of just institutions as being created by the internal divisions of society, and therefore aimed at institutional justice despite differences, today much presumably argues in favour of distinguishing the social system from its natural and human environment, and consequently describing institutional justice as difference: confronting the unbridgeable gap between social institutions and actual people. The reaction to this difference cannot be inclusion, but at most responsiveness. Human rights then are not an answer to distribution problems within a socially divided society, but a response to problems that transcend society. Human rights demand an ecological sensitivity of communication. Human rights achieve justice toward human beings only insofar they transcend the boundaries of communication — a simultaneously impossible

and necessary task.\(^{36}\) And the next follow-up question is: Does not the far-advanced fragmentation of society in turn create new internal boundaries between other subsystems, on the one hand, and between systems and environments outside society, on the other, so that the fairness of specialised social institutions, too, can only properly be posed as an ecological problem?

Such an ecological perception of fundamental rights as ‘just’ boundary relations between social systems and their various internal and external ecologies takes on two new dimensions if we compare it with divisional theories that see people as parts of society and justice as a problem of inequality. First, there is the insurmountable difference between communication and people in its environment. Can communication, then, ever do justice to people? The second dimension is that the question is no longer one of distribution of social resources in the broadest sense, ie power, wealth, knowledge, life chances, among the parts of society. Instead, the point is to constrain the institutions’ acts in such a way that they do not do injustice to the intrinsic rights of their social and human ecologies. The overcoming of inequality among people and the fair distribution of resources is then replaced by two quite different demands on social institutions: firstly internal and external limitation of their expansive tendencies; and secondly sensitive balancing between their intrinsic rationality and the intrinsic rights of their ecologies.

The human-rights tradition is thereby accused of not taking human individuals seriously.\(^{37}\) This is not despite but because of its basic humanistic approach, which leads it – against its better knowledge – to set human beings at the centre of the institutions. The category error of the divisional tradition could be formulated using Magritte’s familiar caption: \textit{ceci n’est pas une pipe}, or in the fundamental-rights context: \textit{la personne n’est pas un être humain}. By understanding fundamental rights as areas of personal autonomy, traditional thought brings about a fatal equation of ‘mind/body’ on the one hand and ‘person’ on the other.\(^{38}\) But if one takes the difference seriously by seeing the ‘person’ as a mere semantic artefact of social communication on the one hand, and mind and body as living, pulsing entities in the communication’s environment on the other, it becomes clear that the humanistic equation of those semantic artefacts with actual people is precisely what does not do justice to flesh and blood people.

That people are not parts of society but insuperably separate from it, has one inexorable consequence: society and mind/body are not communicatively accessible to each other. Mind and body are each independent, self-sustaining (mental

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36 Here the argument comes close to positions on justice that Derrida, n 34 above, exposed most forcefully.


38 ‘Talking about human beings in this context, we refer to a self-organising individual in its whole individuality, in its empirical incomparableness, and no longer to something that could have been integrated into the normative structure of society as an abstraction, as ‘the human being’. N. Luhmann, \textit{Einführung in die Systemtheorie} (Heidelberg: Carl-Auer-Systeme, 2002) 343.

or organic) processes. Both have certainly brought about communication, but cannot control it. Communication becomes autonomous from people, creating its own world of meaning separate from the individual mind. This communication can be used by people productively for their survival, but it can also — and this is the point at which fundamental rights become relevant — turn against them and threaten their integrity, or even terminate their existence. Extreme examples are: killing through a chain of command, sweatshops as a consequence of anonymous market forces, martyrs as a result of religious communication, political or military torture as destruction of identity.

It is in these negative externalities of communication, in their potential to threaten mind and body, that the core of the human-rights problematique lies — not, as the tradition supposed, in social inequality among human beings! The environment-threatening potential of society (seen as a communicative ensemble) is by no means in contradiction with its operative closure; on the contrary, it is its consequence. To be sure, their mutual closure makes society and people inaccessible to each other. Communicative processes cannot penetrate body and mind; the latter are external to communication. But communication can irritate psycho-physical processes in such a way as to threaten their self-preservation. Or it may simply destroy them. This is the place where the body and mind of individuals (not of ‘persons’) demand their ‘pre-legal’, ‘pre-political’, even ‘pre-social’ (i.e. extra-societal) latent intrinsic rights.40 Body and mind insist on their identity and their self-preservation against destructive perturbations of communication — and at the same time without having any forum available before which they could assert these ‘rights’.41 And human rights in the strict sense should be restricted to this ‘crass’ matter of society threatening mental and physical integrity and not burdened with quite different problems of social communication — though the relevance of which for fundamental rights in the broader sense is by no means thereby denied.42

These latent ‘rights’ become overt, however, only if bodily pain and mental suffering no longer remain unheard in their speechlessness, but succeed in irritating society’s communication and provoke new distinctions there.43 The ill-treated bodies’ and souls’ defences can be ‘heard’ only if they are expressed in communication. Those are the social messages of physical violence as anti-power communication, or of suffering souls complaining and protesting. Only then is there a chance for social conflicts about the core area of human rights to develop. But...
these social messages can only ever be proxies, only able to re-present people in communication, not present them directly. These communicative conflicts are not identical to the real conflict that the communication provokes in relation to its ecologies: mind and body. Nor do these communicative conflicts reflect them accurately, but are merely a resonance within society of the external conflicts, mere reconstructions of ecological conflicts within the communication. These communicative conflicts result in rules that are internal to communication, which in their turn can neither regulate nor protect mind and body. But in a complicated fashion they can become relevant for both, if social rules ultimately set extra-communicative bounds on the communication. Here is where the law’s central figure – the legal prohibition: thou shall not – derives its effect beyond the boundaries of the communicative: prohibitions of particular communications (a ban on killing, a ban on torture). Thus ‘latent rights’ (ie intrinsic claims of flesh and blood people to their bodily and mental integrity) become ‘living rights’ in Eugen Ehrlich’s sense and ‘human rights’ in the non-technical legal sense, which can be fought for anywhere in society (not just in law or in politics).

44 That argument explains why it makes no sense to perceive human rights as a decision of the political sovereign (whether a prince or the self-governing people) promulgated by positive law. While human rights do not represent, of course, natural law rights in the sense of some pre-legal absolute validity, they are pre-social (extra-social) in a quite different sense, as being based on the ‘latent rights’ of body and mind to their integrity, and at the same time they are ‘pre-political’ and ‘pre-legal’, as being built on the ‘living law’ of human rights arising out of communicative conflicts in politics, morals, religion or law, and the resulting conflicts. Positivising them as technical law is not some free decision of the legislator, but is based on this double foundation of self-sustaining processes outside society and conflicts within it.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A PROBLEM OF MODERNITY:
EXPANSION OF POLITICAL POWER

The problem of ‘latent human rights’ thus always arises whenever there is communication at all: as ‘intrinsic rights’ of organic life and of mental experience, vis-à-vis the endangerment of their integrity by social communication. In old Europe this was, however, ‘translated’ into the semantics not of human rights, but of the perfection of man in imperfect nature, or of the soul’s salvation in the corrupt world. The original Fall of Man happens at the Tree of Knowledge: the meaning-producing force of communication, with its ability to distinguish good and evil, destroys the original unity of man and nature, makes man god-like and leads to the loss of Paradise. The origin of alienation lies in the very first communication.

Human rights in their specific modern sense appear only with the second Fall. It does not, as for Marx, coincide with the emergence of private property, but with the autonomisation of a multiplicity of separate communicative worlds. First, and visible

44 This is not to be confused with the distinction in legal philosophy between rights in the state of nature and in the civil state.
everywhere since Machiavelli, the matrix of politics becomes autonomous. It becomes detached from the diffuse moral-religious-economic ties of the old European society, and extends to infinity the usurpation potential of its special medium, power, without any immanent restraints. Its operative closure and its structural autonomy let it create new environments for itself, vis-à-vis which it develops expansive, indeed downright imperialist tendencies. Absolute power liberates unsuspected destructive forces. Centralised power for legitimate collective decisions, which develops a special language of its own, indeed a high-flown rationality of the political, has an inherent tendency to totalise them beyond any limit.45

Its expansion goes in two divergent directions. First, it crosses the boundaries to other social sectors. Their response is to invoke their communicative autonomy free from intervention by politics. This response is the birth of fundamental rights, either as personal or institutional rights to autonomy. Fundamental rights demarcate from politics areas of autonomy allotted either to social institutions or to persons as social constructs.46 In both cases fundamental rights set boundaries to the totalising tendencies of the political matrix within society. Second, in its endeavours to control the human mind and body, politics expands with particular verve across the boundaries of society. Their defences become effective only once they can be communicated as protest in the forms of complaints and violence. These protests are translated socially into political struggles of the oppressed against their oppressors, and finally end up, through historical compromises, in political guarantees of the self-limitation of politics vis-à-vis people as psycho-physical entities. Unlike the aforementioned institutional and personal fundamental rights, these political guarantees are human rights in the strict sense.

The fundamental-rights tradition has not separated these 'latent' human rights distinctly from individual and institutional rights to autonomy, but has always translated them into compact individual fundamental rights, through a re-entry of the external into the internal.47 Communication cannot guarantee or regulate the autonomy of the mind, nor even describe it appropriately with any prospect of a correspondence between percept and object. The difference between communication and mind is unbridgeable. But this difference is repeated within communication via re-entry. The same applies to the difference communication/body. Human beings (mind and body) who are not accessible to communication, are modelled within the law as 'persons', as 'bearers of fundamental rights', without any guarantee of a correspondence between constructs of persons within society and people outside it. It is to these artefacts of communication that actions are attributed and areas of freedom granted as fundamental rights. The tradition here makes the pernicious equation of person and human being already criticised above, in the unitary concept of individual fundamental rights. It does not distinguish sufficiently between guarantees of communicative freedoms, on the one hand, and guarantees of psycho-physical integrity on the other. Against this, we must insist on the difference between personal rights and human rights in the

46 On the transformation of individual to institutional fundamental rights, Ladeur, n 31 above, 77.
47 See again Alexy, n 30 above.
strict sense. Human rights in this sense too depend on the technique of re-entry, thus on their attribution to communicative constructs, but are to be understood as having a semantic difference from personal communicative freedoms, namely as intended guarantees of the integrity of mind and body.

**FRAGMENTATION OF SOCIETY: MULTIPLICATION OF EXPANSIVE SOCIAL SYSTEMS**

This model of fundamental rights which is oriented toward politics and the State, works only as long as the State can be identified with society, or at least, the State regarded as society’s organisational form, and politics as its hierarchical coordination. However, insofar as other highly specialised communicative media – money, knowledge, law, medicine, technology – gain autonomy, this model loses its plausibility. At this point, the horizontal effects of fundamental and human rights become relevant. Fragmentation of society multiplies the boundary zones between autonomised communicative matrices and human beings. The new territories of meaning each draw boundaries of their own with their human environments. Here new dangers arise for the integrity of body and mind. These are the issues to which the ‘third-party effect’ of human rights in the strict sense should be confined. Another, no less important, set of issues concerning constitutional rights would be the autonomy of institutional communicative spheres vis-à-vis their ‘private’ subjugation, and a third set of issues would concern the autonomy of personal communicative freedoms.

Thus, human rights cannot be limited to the relation between State and individual, or the area of institutionalised politics, or even solely to phenomena of power in the broadest sense. Specific endangerment of physical and mental integrity by a communicative matrix comes not just from politics, but in principle from all social sectors that have expansive tendencies. For the matrix of the economy, Marx clarified this particularly through such concepts as alienation, autonomy of capital, commodification of the world, exploitation of man by man. Today we see – most clearly in the writings of Foucault, Agamben, Legendre – similar threats to human integrity from the matrices of the natural science, of psychology, the social sciences, technology, medicine, of the press, radio and television. For example, the experiments carried out on people by Dr Mengele were once regarded as an expression of a sadistic personality or as an enslavement of science through the totalitarian Nazi-policy, but subsequent

48 The institutional aspect is emphasised by Ladeur, n 31 above, 64: ‘Fundamental rights are then a contribution to the self-reflection of the private law, when – as with the third-party effect of communicative freedom – it is about the protection of non-economical interests and goods.’

49 Reducing the horizontal effect of fundamental rights to ‘social power’ along the lines of political power is common in labour law. Facing organisational power this stands to reason, yet reduces the question of fundamental rights to a mere phenomenon of balancing powers. See F. Gamillscheg, ‘Die Grundrechte im Arbeitsrecht’ (1964) 164 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 385. Explicit political concepts concerning the horizontal effect of fundamental rights exhibit similar reductions, eg Anderson, n 18 above, 33.

research reveals that the experiments are better regarded as the product of the expansionistic tendencies of science to seize every opportunity to accumulate knowledge, especially as a result of the pressure of international competition, unless it is restrained by external controls.51

By now it should have become clear why it makes no sense to talk about the ‘horizontal effect’ of political fundamental rights. There is no transfer from the State guarantees of individual freedoms into ‘horizontal’ relations between private actors. Something else is needed instead. What is necessary is to develop new types of guarantee that limit the destructive potential of communication outside institutionalised politics against body and mind. The State-action approach thus falls short by letting fundamental rights operate in the private sector only if trace elements of State action can be identified. And the economic power approach is misleading as well, by seeing fundamental rights only as a response to power phenomena. This is much too narrow, since while social power is covered by it, the subtler endangerments to integrity from other communicative matrices, as for example by the monetary mechanism, are not.

Accordingly, it is the fragmentation of society that is today central to the human-rights question. There is not just a single boundary concerning political communication and the individual, guarded by human rights. Instead, the same problems arise in numerous social institutions, each forming its own boundaries with their human environments: not only politics/individual, but also economy/individual, law/individual, science/individual, medicine/individual (never as a whole/part relation, but understood as difference between communication and mind/body). Everything then comes down to the identification of the various frontier posts, so as to recognise the violations that endanger human integrity by their specific characteristics. Where are the frontier posts? – In the various constructs of persons in the subsystems: homo politicus, oeconomicus, juridicus, organisatoricus, retalis etc. These are constructs within communication, but at the same time real points of contact with people ‘out there’.52 It is through the mask of the ‘person’ that the social systems make contact with people; while they cannot communicate with them, they can massively irritate them and in turn be irritated by them. In tight perturbation cycles, communication irritates consciousness with its selective ‘enquiries’, conditioned by assumptions about rational actors, and is irritated by the ‘answers’, in turn highly selectively conditioned. It is in this recursive dynamics that the ‘exploitation’ of man by the social systems (not by the man!) comes about. The social system as a specialised communicative process concentrates its irritations of human beings on the person-constructs. It ‘sucks’ mental and physical energies from them for its own self-preservation. It is only in this highly specific way that Foucault’s disciplinary mechanisms develop their effects.53


52 For details Fuchs, n 39 above, 16-33.

53 For details on the personal constructs as junction between communication and mind see G. Teubner and M. Hutter, ‘Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Juridicus: Communicative Fictions?’ in
THE ANONYMOUS MATRIX

If violations of fundamental rights stem from the totalising tendencies of partial rationalities, there is no longer any point in seeing the horizontal effect of fundamental rights as if the rights of private actors have to be weighed up against each other. The origin of the infringement of fundamental rights needs to be examined closer. The simple part-whole view of society has after effects in the use of the imagery of ‘horizontality’, which unacceptably take the sting out of the whole human-rights issue, as if the sole point of the protection of human rights were that individuals threaten other individuals.

Violation of the integrity of individuals by other individuals, whether through communication or direct physical action, is, however, a completely different set of issues that arose long before the radical fragmentation of society in our days. It must systematically be separated from the fundamental-rights question as such. 54 In the European tradition it is (alongside other constructions) translated by attributing to persons, as communicative representatives of actual human beings, subjective rights against each other. This was philosophically expanded by the theory of subjective rights in the Kantian tradition, according to which ideally the citizens’ spheres of arbitrary freedom are demarcated from each other in such a way that the law can take a generalisable form. Legally, this idea has been most clearly developed in classical law of tort, in which not merely indemnifications, but violations of subjective rights are central. Now, ‘fundamental rights’ in their institutional, personal and human dimensions, as here proposed, differ from subjective rights in private law: They are not about mutual endangerment of private individuals, ie intersubjective relations, but rather about the dangers to the integrity of institutions, persons and individuals that are created by anonymous communicative matrices (institutions, discourses, systems).

The Anglo-American tradition speaks in both cases indifferently about ‘rights’, thereby overlooking from the outset the fundamental distinction between subjective rights and fundamental rights, while in turn being able to deal with them together. By contrast, criminal law concepts of macro-criminality and criminal responsibility of formal organisations come closer to the pertinent issues being considered here. 55 These concepts affect violations of norms that emanate not from human beings, but from impersonal social processes. 56 But they are confined to the dangers stemming from ‘collective actors’ (States, political parties, business firms, groups of companies, associations) and miss the dangers stemming from the anonymous ‘matrix’, from autonomised communicative processes (insti-

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54 Certainly people can do worse to each other by violating rights of the most fundamental kind (life, dignity). But this is not (yet) a fundamental-rights question in this sense, but affects one of The Ten Commandments, fundamental norms of the criminal law and the law of tort. Fundamental rights in the modern sense are not opposed to perils emanating from people, but to perils emanating from the matrix of social systems.


56 For clarification it has to be emphasised that here the individual responsibility does not disappear behind the collective responsibility, rather both exist in parallel.
tutions, functional systems, networks) that are not personified as collectives. Even political human rights should not be seen as relations between political actors (State versus citizen), ie as an expression of person-to-person relations. Instead, political human rights are relations between anonymous power processes, on the one hand, and tortured bodies and hurt souls on the other. This notion is expressed in communication only very imperfectly, not to say misleadingly, as the relation between the State as ‘person’ and the ‘persons’ of the individuals.

It would be repeating the infamous category error of the tradition were one to treat the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in terms of subjective rights between individual persons. That would just end up in the law of tort, with its focus on interpersonal relations. And we would be forced to apply the concrete State-oriented fundamental rights wholesale to the most varied interpersonal relations, with disastrous consequences for elective freedoms in private life. Here lies the rational core of the excessive protests of private lawyers against the intrusion of fundamental rights into private law – though these complaints are in turn exaggerated and overlook the real issues.

The category error can be avoided. Both the 'old' political and the 'new' poly-contextural human-rights question should be understood as people being threatened not by their fellows, but by anonymous communicative processes. These processes must in the first place be identified. Foucault has seen them most clearly, radically depersonalising the phenomenon of power and identifying today's micro-power relations in society's capillaries in the discourses/practices of 'disciplines'.

We can now summarise the outcome of our abstract considerations. The human-rights question in the strictest sense must today be seen as endangerment of individuals' integrity of body and mind by a multiplicity of anonymous and today globalised communicative processes. The fragmentation of world society into autonomous subsystems creates new boundaries outside society between subsystem and human being and new boundaries inside society between the various subsystems. The expansive tendencies of the subsystems aim in both directions. It now becomes clear how a new ‘equation’ replaces the old ‘equation’ of the horizontal effect. The old one was based on a relation between two private actors – private perpetrator and private victim of the infringement. On one side of the

57 Critical towards the consideration of subjective rights in the range of the horizontal effect, Ladeur, n 31 above, 58–80.
59 Foucault, n 50 above, 135–169. Foucault’s problem is however his obsessive fixation on the phenomenon of power, which leads him to inflate the concept of power meanlessly, and as a consequence he cannot discern the more subtle effects of other communication media.
new equation is no longer a private actor as the fundamental-rights violator, but the anonymous matrix of an autonomised communicative medium. On the other side is no longer simply the compact individual. Instead, owing to the presence of new boundaries, the protection of the individual, hitherto seen in unitary terms, splits up into several dimensions. On this other side of the equation, the fundamental rights have to be systematically divided into three or even four dimensions.

Firstly, institutional rights which protect the autonomy of social discourses – the autonomy of art, of science, of religion – against their subjugation by the totalising tendencies of the communicative matrix. By protecting them against totalitarian tendencies of science, media or economy, fundamental rights take effect as ‘conflict of law rules’ between partial rationalities in society.61

Secondly, personal rights which protect the autonomy of communications, attributed not to institutions, but to the social artefacts called ‘persons’.

Thirdly, human rights as negative bounds on societal communication, where the integrity of individuals’ body and mind is endangered by a communicative matrix that crosses boundaries. (Additionally, though not systematically discussed here: ecological rights, where society endangers the integrity of natural processes).

It should be stressed that specific fundamental rights are to be allocated to these dimensions not on the basis of one-to-one, but with a multiplicity of overlaps. Some fundamental rights are mainly to be attributed to one dimension or the other (eg freedom of art, freedom of science, and property primarily to the institutional rights dimension, freedom of speech primarily to the personal rights dimension, and freedom of conscience primarily to the human-rights dimension). Some display all three dimensions (eg religious freedom). It is all the more important, therefore, to distinguish the three dimensions carefully within the various fundamental rights.

JUSTICIABILITY?

Let us now concentrate on the third dimension, human rights in the strictest sense that protect the integrity of mind and body. The ensuing question for lawyers is: Can the issue of the ‘horizontal’ effects of fundamental rights be reformulated from a focus of conflicts within society (person versus person) to conflicts between society and its ecologies (communication versus body/mind)? In other words, can horizontal effects be transplanted from the paradigm of interpersonal conflicts between individual bearers of fundamental rights to that of ecological conflicts between anonymous communicative processes, on the one hand, and concrete people on the other?

The difficulties are enormous. To list only a few:

How can destructive system/environment relations 'between' the universes Communication and Consciousness be addressed at all by communication as a conflict, as social conflict or indeed as legal conflict – a real Lyotard style of problem: if not as litige, then at least as différend? Failing a supreme court for meaning, all that can happen is that mental experience endures the infringement and then fades away unheard. Or else it gets 'translated' into communication, but then the paradoxical and highly unlikely demand will be for the infringer of the right (society, communication) to punish its own crime! That means turning poachers into gamekeepers. But bear in mind that by institutionalising political fundamental rights, several nation states have managed precisely this gamekeeper-poacher self-limitation – however imperfectly.

How can the law describe the boundary conflict, when after all it has only the language of 'rights' of 'persons' available? Can it, in this impoverished rights talk, in any way reconstruct the difference between interpersonal conflicts and communicative endangerments of individuals via external social conflicts? Here we reach the limits of what is conceivable in legal doctrine, and the limits of court proceedings as well. In litigation there must always be a claimant suing a defendant for infringing his rights. In this framework of mandatory binarisation as person/person-conflicts, can human rights ever be asserted against the structural violence of anonymous social processes? The only way this can happen – at any rate in litigation – is simply to re-use the category error so harshly criticised above, but immanently correcting it, in an awareness of its falsehood, by introducing a difference. That means individual suits against private actors, in which human rights, though not rights of persons against persons but of flesh-and-blood human beings against structural violence of the matrix, are asserted. In traditional terms, the institutional conflict that is really meant has to take place within individual forms of action. We are already familiar with something similar from existing institutional theories of fundamental rights, which recognise as their bearers not only persons, but also institutions. Whoever enforces individual freedom of expression simultaneously protects the integrity of the political process. But the point here is not about rights of impersonal institutions against the State but, in a multiple inversion of the relation, rights of individuals outside society against social institutions outside the State.

Is this distinction justiciable? Can person/person-conflicts be separated from individual/individual-conflicts, on the one hand, and these separated in turn from communication/individual-conflicts on the other hand, if after all communication is enabled only via persons? Translated into the language of law, this becomes a problem of attribution. Whodunnit? Under what conditions can the concrete endangerment of integrity be attributed not to persons or individuals, but to anonymous communication processes? If this attribution could be achieved, a

genuine human-rights problem would have been formulated even in the impoverished rights talk of the law.\textsuperscript{64}

In an extreme simplification, the ‘horizontal’ human-rights problematique can perhaps be described in familiar legal categories as follows. The problem of human rights in private law arises only where the endangerment of body/mind integrity comes from social ‘institutions’ (and not just from individual actors). In principle, institutions include private formal organisations and private regulatory systems. The most important examples here would be business firms, private associations, hospitals, schools, universities as formal organisations; and general terms of trade, private standardisation and similar rule-setting mechanisms as private regulatory systems. We must of course be clear that the term ‘institution’ represents only imperfectly the chains of communicative acts that endanger the integrity of mind and body, and does not completely grasp the expansive phenomenon that is really intended, that is the whole sense of the metaphor of the anonymous ‘matrix’. But for lawyers, who are oriented toward rules and persons, ‘institution’ has the advantage of being defined as a bundle of norms and at the same time being able to be personified. The concept of the institution could accordingly respecify fundamental rights in social sectors (much as it can be employed for the State as institution and as person in the field of politics). The outcome would then be a formula of ‘third-party effect’ which could seem plausible also to a black-letter lawyer. It would not regard horizontal effect as a balancing between the fundamental rights of individual bearers of them, but instead as the protection of human rights and rights of discourses vis-à-vis expansive social institutions.

HIV/AIDS VERSUS TNC

With now heightened but at the same time lowered expectations, let us take another look at the HIV catastrophe in South Africa. I cannot offer a solution, but at best suggest directions in which thinking about human rights might develop. It should be fairly clear how inadequate it is in court proceedings to weigh up a patient’s individual fundamental right to life against the transnational corporation’s individual property right. The matter is not one concerned with corporate social responsibility, with a single corporate actor infringing the fundamental rights of AIDS patients through its pricing policy. A human right of access to medication can become a reality only if the ‘horizontal’ effect of fundamental rights is reformulated from interpersonal conflicts to system/environment conflicts.

In the institutional dimension, the conflict needs to be set in its social context, which requires us to observe that the AIDS catastrophe is ultimately due to a clash of incompatible logics of action.\textsuperscript{66} The critical conflict arises in the domain of patent rights to medicines and is the contradiction between norms of economic rationality with norms formed in the health context.\textsuperscript{66} In this case, the point is

\textsuperscript{64} This problem is comparable to the demarcation of sovereign and fiscal actions in public law or of actions of agents and personal actions in private law.

\textsuperscript{65} Cf Teubner (2000), n 61 above.

\textsuperscript{66} On the details of the current conflict and perspectives of possible resolutions, Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, n 7 above, 999.
not, then, to impose price controls on particular pharmaceutical firms, but to develop abstract and general rules on incompatibilities between the business sector and the health sector, and prepare World International Property Organisation (WIPO), WTO and UN law, as part of a transnational patent law, to respond to destructive conflicts between incompatible logics of action by building health concerns into norms of economic rationality. Since there is no paramount court for the conflict, it can only be solved from the viewpoint of one of the conflicting regimes, here the WTO. But the competing logic of action, here the principles of the health sector, has to be brought into the international economic-law context as a limitation.

It is, however, to be feared that the genuine human-rights dimension will not be adequately taken into account. In other words, if access to medication is not lastingly improved by the measures now decided and the planned WIPO treaties, the transnational development of patent law in relation to pharmaceutical products will have to be adjusted again, whether by granting, in transparent, procedurally simplified and low-cost fashion, the right to compulsory licensing, or by a licence or patent exception system graded according to economic capacity, or finally by the radical cure of a general settlement that would completely remove certain medicines from the protection of transnational patent law for a period.67

This sketch of legal ways to react to the AIDS catastrophe shows how inappropriate the optimism is that the human-rights problem can be solved using the resources of legal policy. Even institutional rights confront the law with the boundaries between other social subsystems. Can one discourse do justice to the other? This is a problem the dilemmas of which have been analysed by Lyotard.68 But it is at least a problem within society, one Luhmann sought to respond to with the concept of justice as socially adequate complexity.69 The situation is still more dramatic with human rights in the strict sense, located at the boundary between communication and the individual human being. All the groping attempts to juridify human rights cannot hide the fact that this is a strictly impossible project. How can society ever 'do justice' to real people if people are not its parts but stand outside communication, if society cannot communicate with them but at most about them, indeed not even reach them but merely either irritate or destroy them? In the light of grossly inhuman social practices the justice of human rights is a burning issue, but one which has no prospect of resolution. This has to be said in all rigour.

68 Lyotard, n 34 above, para 1.
69 Luhmann, n 37 above, 214; idem, Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts: Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981) 374; idem, Rechtssystem und Rechtsdogmatik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1974) 20–23.
If a positive concept of justice in the relation between communication and human being is definitively impossible, then what is left, if we are not to succumb to post-structuralist quietism, is only second best. In the law, we have to accept that the problem of the integrity of body and mind can only be experienced through the inadequate sensors of irritation, reconstruction and re-entry. The deep dimension of conflicts between communication on the one hand, and mind and body on the other can at best be surmised at by law. And the only signpost left is the legal prohibition, through which a self-limitation of communication seems possible. But even this prohibition can describe the transcendence of the other only allegorically. This programme of justice is ultimately doomed to fail, and cannot, with Derrida, console itself that it is 'to come, à venir', but it has to face up its being in principle impossible. The justice of human rights can, then, at best be formulated negatively. It is aimed at removing unjust situations, not creating just ones. It is only the counter-principle to communicative violations of body and soul, a protest against inhumanities of communication, without it ever being possible to say positively what the conditions of 'humanly just' communication might be.

Nor do the emancipatory programmes of modernity help any further. No information comes from criteria of democratic involvement of individuals in social processes, since only persons take part, not bodies or minds. From this viewpoint one can only be amazed at the naïvety of participatory romanticism. Democratic procedures are no test of a society’s human rights justice. Equally uninformative are universalisation theories that proceed transcendentally via a priori characteristics or via a posteriori universalisation of expressed needs. What do such philosophical abstractions have to do with actual human individuals? The same applies to economic theories of individual preferences aggregated through market mechanisms.

Only the self-observation of mind/body – introspection, suffering, pain – can judge whether communication infringes human rights. If these self-observations, however distorted, gain entry to communication, then there is some chance of humanly just self-limitation of communication. The decisive thing is the ‘moment’: the simultaneity of consciousness and communication, the cry that expresses pain. Hence we observe the closeness of justice to spontaneous indignation, unrest, protest, and its remoteness from philosophical, political and legal discourses.

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70 This may explain the high value that is ascribed to the prohibition in law by authors with different theoretical backgrounds, R. Wiethölder, ‘Justifications of a Law of Society’ in O. Perez and G. Teubner (eds), Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 66; Legendre, n 50 above, ch 5.

71 Derrida, n 34 above, 969.

72 Even if there is no doubt that democratic procedures might increase political sensitivity concerning human rights issues.